بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

26 Dhul Qa’dah, 1444 AH (Friday, 16 June , 2023)

After defining Ṣaḥīḥ and explaining the definition, ‘Allāmah Ibn aṣ-Ṣalāḥ now explains and clarifies what it means when a scholar grades or describes a narration as being Ṣaḥīḥ. He writes:

ومتى قالوا: ” هذا حديث صحيح ” فمعناه: أنه اتصل سنده مع  سائر الأوصاف المذكورة

 ‘Allāmah Zarkashī remarked on this:

جعل المصنف مدار الحكم ‌بصحة ‌الحديث على الحكم بصحة الإسناد المستكمل للشرائط  (النكت للزركشي – 1 / 119)

He is saying that apparently it seems as if ‘Allāmah Ibn aṣ-Ṣalāḥ is basing the grading on a narration entirely upon the chain, whereas the text of the narration is also evaluated in order to determine the status of a narration. Based on that he said:

 أن السند قد يكون صحيحا مع الحكم على المتن بالضعف (النكت للزركشي – 1 / 119)

 ‘Allāmah Zarkashī then responded to this objection by explaining that the definition that ‘Allāmah Ibn aṣ-Ṣalāḥ has given is comprehensive and encompassing enough to cover the chain and the text. He highlights that ‘Allāmah Ibn aṣ-Ṣalāḥ also stressed here saying that every condition must be fulfilled:

والجواب: أن في قول ابن الصلاح: ((مع سائر الأوصاف)) ما يدفع هذا الاعتراض ، لأن من جملتها انتفاء العلة ، وهي ها هنا موجودة ، فليس صحة الإسناد وحده مقتضيا للصحة حتى يرد هذا. نعم ينبغي التأمل والنظر بين قولهم: ((هذا حديث صحيح)) و ((هذا إسناد صحيح)) وبينهما فرق فإن الثاني يريدون به اتصال الإسناد وعدم انقطاعه ، لا جودة الرجال فربما كان متن الحديث ضعيفا وإسناده جيدا بخلاف قولهم ((حديث صحيح)) (النكت للزركشي – 1 / 119)

On that point, Shaykh ‘Awwāmah explains:

والأئمة المحدثون لم يقصروا جهودهم في التصحيح والتضعيف  على خدمة ما يسمى ب “النقد الخارجي”، أي نقد الأسانيد، فإن سلمت صححوا المتون، وإلا فلا، وهذا ظاهر جدا لمن تأمل تقسيماتهم، فضلا عمن غاص وأمعن في كلامهم (تعليقة التدريب الراوي – 2 / 194)

Nevertheless, the point that ‘Allāmah Ibn aṣ-Ṣalāḥ is making is that when the Muḥāddithīn say that a narration is authentic, then they simply mean that it fulfils these conditions. 

In the next segment of his sentence, ‘Allāmah Ibn aṣ-Ṣalāḥ says that we cannot be absolutely sure that the Prophet (ṣallAllāhu ‘alayhu wa sallam) did indeed say that statement or carry out the action. He says:

وليس من شرطه أن يكون مقطوعا به في نفس الأمر، 

By a narration simply fulfilling these five conditions, it does not necessarily mean that a person will obtain absolute conviction that the narration is authentic.

Rather, a person would attain Ghalabah aḍ-Ḍann (Greater thought: strong inclination to accepting). He would not get absolute conviction that these are indeed from the Prophet (ṣallAllāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam). Consider the following outcomes:

• A person will not obtain such conviction that he will be able to take an oath and say: “I swear by Allāh Ta’ālā that the Prophet (ṣal Allāhu ʿalayhī wa-sallam) said…”. 
• Likewise, he will not have absolute confidence that he will be able to suspend the divorce of his wife on the authenticity of the narration; such that if it is not Ṣaḥīḥ his wife is divorced. 
• A person who accepts the authority of Aḥādīth but rejects the authenticity of this one narration cannot be considered as Kāfir.

It simply means that apparently, the narration fulfils the conditions mentioned, and now we are comfortable enough to accept it. We are more inclined to believe that the Prophet (ṣallAllāhu ‘alayho wa sallam) did indeed utter those words or do that action.  

In an-Nukat al-Wafiyyah, ‘Allāmah Baqā’ī mentioned that this corresponds with the statement of Imām Shāfi’ī:

ولو ‌شك في هذا شاك لم نقل له تب وقلنا ليس لك إن كنت عالمنا أن تشك كما ليس لك إلا أن تقضي بشهادة الشهود العدول وإن أمكن فيهم الغلط ولكن تقضي بذلك على الظاهر من صدقهم والله ولي ما غاب عنك منهم. (الرسالة للشافعي – ص: 461)

Types of Certainty and Knowledge

There are three types of knowledge:

1. Al-ʿIlm al-Yaqīn al-Qatʿī (Absolute Firm conviction)

This is knowledge that a person will accept and be convinced the moment he witnesses it with one of his five senses. He would not require any proof or any further details to believe in it. 

For example, if a person walks outside at midday and says to his friend it is daytime now; he will not be required to present any proof for his claim – it is obvious. 

Shaykh Ḥātim al-‘Awnī presents the following examples:

ومثل إذا خرجت والشمس بازغة فتيقنت أنه نهار، أو أخبرك شخص أن النهار قد بزغ، هذا لا يحتاج إلى إعمال ذهن، ومثل: أن تخبر عن نفسك أنك حزين أو سعيد أو راض أو غضبان أو جائع أو شبعان: هذه أمور تهجم إلى القلب لا تحتاج إلى تفكر واستدلال (التكميل والإيضاح – ص: 138)ʿ

2. Ilm an-Naḍarī

That knowledge that will not be understood except if a person uses his mind/intellect or conducts some research or makes some inference. A person will need a little education to gain the knowledge. For example, medical terms are used by a doctor. A layperson will not understand, however, others in his fraternity would. They would understand it due to their prior learning. The earlier basic knowledge helps them in attaining more knowledge.

A more simpler example is, if it was said: 5 x 6 = 30. A person will have to know multiplication or how to use a calculator or work out this sum in any way, then only will be able to get the correct answer. He needs to use his intellect and prior information to reach the answer and get knowledge.

This is called Taṣdīqāt and Taṣawwurāt in the science of Manṭiq. In the books of Manṭiq they give the example: ‘When one sees smoke, one may conclude that there is a fire’. To reach this conclusion, one would need to know that smoke emanates from fire. In this case the inference is correct.

Alternatively, an inference could be incorrect. Take the following example:

A person could see a black cat, then another black cat, and then a third black cat. That could lead him to conclude that all cats are black. However, this conclusion is incorrect.

Thus, an inference may be correct or incorrect. However, the point here is that in order to make an inference in the first place, a person needs to possess some pieces of information and have some basic knowledge to reach a conclusion. The knowledge required may be at a basic level or it may be at an advanced level of knowledge. Ḥāfiḍ Ibn Ḥajar said:

إذ النظر: ‌ترتيب [‌أمور ‌معلومة] ‌أو ‌مظنونة يتوصل بها إلى علوم أو ظنون، وليس في العامي أهلية ذلك، فلو كان نظريا؛ لما حصل لهم. (نزهة النظر – ص: 12)ʿ

3. Ilm Ghalabah aḍ-Ḍan

A person does not have absolute conviction, but he cannot deny the great possibility of the information being true. He is more inclined to accept such information.

‘Allāmah Ibn aṣ-Ṣalāḥ is saying that we cannot get ‘Ilm al-Yaqīnī al-Qatī from a Khabr al-Wāhid. 

The reason why we cannot get absolute knowledge is because of the possibility of a reliable person making a mistake. ‘Allāmah ‘Irāqī explained:

أي: حيث قال أهل الحديث: هذا حديث صحيح، فمرادهم فيما ‌ظهر ‌لنا عملا بظاهر الإسناد، لا أنه مقطوع بصحته في نفس الأمر، لجواز الخطأ والنسيان على الثقة، هذا هو الصحيح الذي عليه أكثر أهل العلم. (شرح التبصرة والتذكرة – 1 / 105)

Shaykh ‘Awwāmah advised that we should read what Mawlāna Abdul Hayy Laknawī and Shaykh Abdul Fattāh Abu Ghuddah have written. Maulāna Abdul Hayy Lakhnawī (may Allāh Ta’ālā have mercy on him) states:

‌‌إيقاظ الخامس في مدى الحكم على الحديث بالصحة او الحسن او الضعف

 حيث قال اهل الحديث هذا حديث صحيح او حسن فمرداهم فيما ‌ظهر ‌لنا ‌عملا بظاهر الاسناد لا انه مقطوع بصحته في نفس الامر لجواز الخطأ والنسيان على الثقة. (الرفع والتكميل – ص: 189)

A Reliable Person Making A Mistake

Logically, we will all agree that a reliable and trustworthy person could make a mistake. 

A trustworthy person could relate some news to us, yet, we will  persist and ask them: “Really? Is it confirmed? Are you sure?” etc. In spite of that person’s trustworthiness and integrity, we are hesitant to accept the news. This is not because we doubt the informant’s integrity, but rather, we are cautious and maintain that perhaps the informant has erred.

This is applicable to narrators too: they can also make mistakes and err.

Imām Muslim (may Allāh Ta’ālā have mercy on him) mentions in Kitāb at-Tamyīz:

فليس ‌من ‌ناقل ‌خبر وحامل أثر من السلف الماضين الى زماننا وان كان من أحفظ الناس وأشدهم توقيا وإتقانا لما يحفظ وينقل الا الغلط والسهو ممكن في حفظه ونقله. (التمييز لمسلم – ص: 170)

“There is no bearer of Ḥādīth and carrier of Tradition from the past predecessors up to our time – even if he is one of the best memorisers from the people, and most extreme of them in piety and proficient concerning what he memorises and transmits – except (that) error and negligence is possible in his memorisation and his transmission.” (At-Tamyīz Li Muslim, page: 170)

In fact, even the greatest of Imāms made mistakes. Those with the best of memories erred. Imām Tirmidhī (may Allāh Ta’ālā have mercy on him) wrote:

مع أنه لم يسلم من الخطأ والغلط كبير أحد من الأئمة مع حفظهم (العلل الصغير للترمذي – 5 / 741)

“Although none of the greatest Imāms were safe from mistake and error with regard to their memorisation.” (Al-ʿIlal aṣ-Ṣaghīr, 5 / 741)

Imām Aḥmad commented on the great Imām Yaḥyā ibn Sa’īd al-Qaṭṭān:

ما رأيت أقل خطأ من يحيى ولقد أخطأ في أحاديث ثم قال ومن يعرى من الخطأ والتصحيف  (تهذيب التهذيب – 11 / 192)

“I did not see the least mistake from Yaḥyā (a great scholar and the teacher of Imām Mālik) yet certainly he erred in Aḥādīth. Then he said, who can be free from error and mistakes?” (Tahdhīb at-Tahdhīb, 11 / 192)

This is the reality; everyone did make mistakes.

There are many more quotations that may be given. We will suffice by quoting one more; ‘Allāmah adh-Dhahabī (may Allāh Ta’ālā have mercy on him) said:

وما ثم أحد بمعصوم من السهو والنسيان، وما هذا التغير بضار أصلا، وإنما الذي يضر الاختلاط، وهشام فلم يختلط قط، هذا أمر مقطوع به، وحديثه محتج به في” الموطأ ” والصحاح، ” والسنن ” فقول ابن القطان: ” إنه اختلط ” قول مردود، مرذول. فأرني إماما من الكبار سلم من الخطأ والوهم. فهذا شعبة، وهو في الذروة، له أوهام، وكذلك معمر، والأوزاعي، ومالك، رحمة الله عليهم. (سير أعلام النبلاء – 6 / 36)

“Then no one is innocent from negligence and forgetfulness, and this change is not inherently harmful, and indeed that which harms is suffering from loss of memory (e.g. dementia), and Hishām did not ever suffer from loss of memory, this is certain concerning him and his Ḥadīth. He was objected upon in the “Muwaṭṭaʾ” and the “Ṣiḥāḥ” and the “Sunan”, so the statement of Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, “Indeed he suffers loss of memory” is a rejected, depraved statement. Then show me an Imām from the elders (who is) safe from error and misinterpretation. Look at Shu’bah, who is at the peak, yet he erred. Likewise, Mu’ammar, and al-Awzā’ī, and Mālik, may Allāh have mercy on them.” (Siyar Aʿlām an-Nubalā, 6 / 36)

Irrespective of how great a scholar is, ultimately, the scholar is still a human, and hence he is susceptible to mistakes. Based on this reason, the vast majority of scholars claimed that one will only obtain aẓ–Ẓann al-Ghālib (overpowering thought) from a Khabr al-Wāḥid.

Shaykh ‘Abdul Fattāḥ wrote in the footnotes of Ar-Raf’ wat takmīl:

وبسبب هذا الجواز والاحتمال، الذي قامت أدلته وثبتت شواهده، في كثير من أخبار الأحاد، نزل خبر الفرد الثقة عن إفادة اليقين بمفرده إلى إفادة اليقين (تعليقة الرفع والتكميل – ص: 189)

 ‘Allāmah ‘Irāqī said:

هذا هو ‌الصحيح ‌الذي ‌عليه ‌أكثر ‌أهل ‌العلم، (شرح التبصرة والتذكرة – 1 / 105)

إذ منه ما ينفرد بروايته عدل واحد  وليس من الأخبار التي أجمعت الأمة على تلقيها بالقبول.  

In this sentence, ‘Allāmah Ibn aṣ-Ṣalāḥ is indicating that there are exclusions. There are times when a Khabr al-Wāḥīd can actually convey full knowledge. At this point, he gives the example of Talaqqī bil Qabūl, and later he will present other examples.

It is possible that a narration has been mentioned from one or two chain which may even be weak, but the entire Ummah accepts the purport of that narration. This will strengthen the narration. For example, Imām Shāfi’ī applied this principle and accepted a weak narration. He wrote in ar-Risālah:

ووجدنا أهل الفتيا ومن حفظنا عنه من أهل العلم بالمغازي من قريش وغيرهم لا يختلفون في أن النبي قال عام الفتح: لا وصية لوارث، ولا يقتل مؤمن كافر – ويأثرونه عن من حفظوا عنه ممن لقوا من أهل العلم بالمغازي، فكان هذا نقل عامة عن عامة، وكان أقوى في بعض الأمر من نقل واحد عن واحد وكذلك وجدنا أهل العلم عليه مجتمعين (الرسالة – 61-60)

“We found Jurists and scholars from whom we have learnt of the military campaign, from the Quraysh and others, none differ with that fact that the Prophet ﷺ stated during the Year of the Conquest: No bequest can be made for an inheritor and a believer cannot be killed in place of a disbeliever.

Scholars give preference to this over those who have learnt from him, then those that are knowledgeable of these military campaigns. This is narrated by a large group, from a large group, and this is more strong than a narration from one person who takes it from a single person. And this is how we found the consensus of the scholars regarding this.” (Ar-Risālah, page 60 – 61)

With regards to the 47th narration of the Muwaṭṭā, ‘Allāmah Ibn ‘Abdil Barr incorrectly assumed that the narration is weak, but then he accepted it due to this concept of Talaqqī. He said:

وهو عندي صحيح، لأن العلماء تلقوه بالقبول له، والعمل به، ولا يخالف في جملته أحد من الفقهاء، وإنما الخلاف في بعض معانيه على ما نذكر إن شاء الله. (التمهيد – 10 / 251) 

‘Allāmah ‘Alā’ ud-Dīn al-Mardāwī (may Allāh Ta’ālā have mercy on him) quotes from Shaykh Muwaffaq ad-Dīn:

وقال: والذي عليه الأصوليون من أصحاب أبي حنيفة، والشافعي، وأحمد أن خبر الواحد إذا تلقته الأمة بالقبول تصديقا له، وعملا به يوجب العلم، إلا فرقة قليلة تبعوا طائفة من أهل الكلام أنكروا ذلك. التحبير شرح التحرير (4/ 1814)

The same ruling applies when a Muḥaddith says that a narration is weak:

وكذا قولهم هذا حديث ضعيف ومرادهم أنهم لم تظهر لنا فيه شروط الصحة لا أنه كذب في نفس الأمر في جواز الصدق الكاذب.

It is possible for a liar to speak the truth. This is proven from the following incident of Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī:

وقال ‌عثمان بن الهيثم: حدثنا ‌عوف عن ‌محمد بن سيرين عن ‌أبي هريرة رضي الله عنه قال: «وكلني رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم بحفظ زكاة رمضان فأتاني آت فجعل يحثو من الطعام فأخذته فقلت: لأرفعنك إلى رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم فذكر الحديث فقال: إذا أويت إلى فراشك فاقرأ آية الكرسي لن يزال من الله حافظ ولا يقربك شيطان حتى تصبح فقال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: صدقك وهو ‌كذوب ذاك شيطان.». (صحيح البخاري – 4 / 123)

‘Allāmah ‘Irāqī added:

وإصابة من هو كثير الخطأ. (شرح التبصرة والتذكرة ألفية العراقي – 1 / 106)

Mawlānā ‘Abdul Ḥayy says:

هذا هو القول الصحيح الذي عليه أكثر. (الرفع والتكميل – ص: 189)

‘Allāmah Sakhāwī presents the summary saying:

والحاصل أن الصحة والضعف مرجعهما إلى وجود الشرائط وعدمها بالنسبة إلي غلبة الظن، لا بالنسبة إلى الواقع في الخارج. (فتح المغيث – 1 / 30)

Rejecting a Ṣaḥīḥ al-Khabr al-Wāḥid or Accepting a Ḍa‘īf al-Khabr al-Wāḥid Based on this

(Note: al-Khabr al-Wāḥid refers to the Ḥadīth. We are simply using the term al-Khabr al-Wāḥid, because Mutawātir does not feature under this discussion.  If you want, you may replace al-Khabr al-Wāḥid with the word Ḥadīth.)

In the footnotes, Shaykh Abdul Fattah Abu Ghuddah (may Allāh Ta’ālā have mercy on him) states:

ولا يصح لعاقل أن يستند إلى هذا الاحتمال والجواز المجرد فيُلْغي اعتماد خبر الثقة، أو يستند إلى احتمال إصابة كثير الخطأ، أو  إلى احتمال صدق الكاذب، فيقبل خبرهم.

It cannot be said that we will not act upon the narration based on this possibility. That although this person is honest and we have no reservations regarding his integrity, yet being a human, it is possible that he is making a mistake, and hence we are not going to accept his narration.

Or, looking at it from the other angle, we know that this person is a liar but we have to have good thoughts about this person and it is also proven from Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī that the greatest liar spoke the truth, hence we will accept his narration – a case of innocent until proven guilty.  

A person should not get this wrong understanding and feel that we either cannot practise on the narrations or we either have to accept all narrations. 

We have act upon what is apparent to us.

Two Types Of Iḥtimāl

There are two types of Ihtimālāt (doubts):

1.Jawāz Wāqʿī (Great Possibility of Occurrence)

This refers to cases where that is a great chance of something happening. For example, if the walls of a house are unsteady then it is likely they will collapse. The logical and wise thing to do in this case is to avoid the building. It will actually be foolish to enter a building with wobbly walls.

Similarly, it was wise not to partake of food that presented by an enemy out of fear it may be poisoned.

Hence, it will not be foolish to exercise caution. 

Had the chances of mistakes and lying been at this level, it would have made perfect sense not to practise on the authentic narration or to accept narrations of liars.

2.Jawāz ʿAqlī (Logical Possibility Although Far-Fetched)

This refers to something that has a minimal chance of happening, although it is logically possible.

For example, it is absolutely possible that the walls or roof can fall upon you collapse.  Will it be logical for you to say that you are going to stay outside and never ever enter any building due to this possibility?

If you go in a car, is it possible that you can make an accident, or someone else can bump into you (may Allāh Ta’ālā save you). You may even be able to give statistics on how many cars have crashed and lives were lost.  A person will not say that they are never going to sit in a car due to this reason.

It will be regarded as foolish to refuse a meal prepared by your loved one because of the possibility of it being poisoned. 

A person will never say that they are not getting married because they know of a friend who got married to someone who they assumed was an angel but he turned out to be a tyrant and a devil in sheep clothing!

These are all things that are possible to happen, but we cannot have excessive doubts and take too much caution, otherwise it will not be practical to lead our lives.

The statements of ‘Allāmah Ibn aṣ-Ṣalāḥ falls into this category. Whilst it is possible that despite these five-seven conditions being fulfilled, the narration will still be weak, the greater chance will be that the narration will be authentic. 

Shaykh ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghuddah explained:

ولو فتحنا باب ((الجواز والاحتمال المجرد))، في قبول الأخبار أو ردها، لدخلنا في الوساوس والأوهام! وتخبطنا كل التخبط! (تعليقة الرفع والتكميل – ص: 190)

Before that he said:

إن إمكان الوقوع غير الوقوع ، وإنما نزلت من رتبة اليقين إلى الظن بهذا الاحتمال (تعليقة الرفع والتكميل – ص: 190)

This should not be used as a means of negating many Aḥādīth of the Messenger of Allāh (ṣal Allāhu ʿalayhī wa-sallam), nor can it be a means of attributing the statements of liars to the Prophet (ṣallAllāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam).

Question

If the authentic narration only gives the Fāʾidah of Dhann al-ghālib and not of absolute ‘Ilm, then what happens to the established principle:

إذا جاء الاحتمال بطل الإستدلال.

In the case of doubt, a ḥadīth cannot be used for Istidlāl (used as a proof of Sharī‘ah). What is the response to this?

Answer

‘Allāmah Baqāʿī quotes that Ḥāfiḍ Ibn Ḥajar said:

لا يوقف الدليل إلا الاحتمال الأرجح أو المساوي.

Nothing prevents a dalīl, except if there is such a doubt which can compete with the principle you have established.

Therefore, Shaykh ‘Awwāmah (may Allāh Ta’ālā have mercy on him) said:

أما الاحتمال الضعيف أو الواهي في هذه الاحتمالات الواهية فلا تبطل الدليل أبدا.

A baseless doubt is not given any consideration.

May Allāh Taʿālā have mercy on them all.

سبحانك اللهم وبحمدك ، أشهد أن لا إله إلا أنت ، أستغفرك وأتوب إليك